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Abstract 
Suppose that any two # sets are comparable inthe sense of Wadge degrees. Then every real 
has a dagger. This argument proceeds by using the Dodd-Jensen core model theory to show 
that Vx E ~“(~‘33) along with, say, 10’ implies the existence of a KIi norm of length u2. 
As a result of more recent work by John Steel, the same argument will extend to show that the 
Wadge comparability of all KIi sets implies @ determinacy. 
0. Preface 
The main purpose of this article is to explore the consequences of l-If Wadge 
determinancy. In my dissertation this was shown to imply daggers, and indeed the 
existence of inner models with many strong cardinals. In fact, the dissertation gave 
a proof that if a suitable form of the C: correctness of K holds, then II: Wadge 
determinacy implies II: determinacy. 
Later John Steel proved a slightly weaker form of correctness. However, the same 
argument obviously adapts - thereby giving a proof of II: determinacy from 
l-I: Wadge determinacy. The converse implication - that n: determinacy yields 
n: Wadge determinacy - was previously known. Ref. [13] shows that Boolean @‘I:) 
determinacy implies l-I: Wadge determinacy, and [S] shows that l-If determinacy 
implies Boolean (IYI:) determinacy. 
Except where indicated, I have followed the notations and conventions of [4]. 
General facts regarding descriptive set theory can be found in either [4] or [9]. 
Section 3 will require a knowledge of the fine structure of L[E] as developed in [S]. 
Refs. [lo] and [ 1 l] are still unpublished at the time of writing, so I will attempt to 
state everything needed from these two works. 
Section 1 presents some background. Section 2 builds the long norm given TO’, 
and derives the daggers given the Wadge determinancy. Section 3 shows how a suit- 
able form of Xi correctness allows us to prove determinacy. 
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1. Introduction 
I will work in the topological space ww, and even go as far as calling it the reals. This 
is only for ease of presentation, and almost everything said below will hold of the true 
reals, R, in virtue of well-known coding devices. Lower-case letters such as x, y, z, w, 
and so on, will generally denote reals, Upper-case letters, such as A or B, will stand for 
sets of reals. Lower case Greek letters - CI, fi, y, 6 - will represent ordinals. 
Notation 1.1. z E _Y(L[x]) will be used to denote that r is Skolem function definable 
over L[x]. I will have the convention that any appearance of r(c(r, . . . ,c1.) indicates 
that ~1~ < ... < ~1, - so the Skolem terms are only applied to increasing strings of 
ordinals. 
T(x”,cr) will denote the canonical expansion of x’ along the indiscrenibles (ci)iEOL. 
(This is what [4] would call (Z, c1), for C = x”), 
If x’ exists, then (cf)ieord will denote the enumeration of the L[x] indiscernibles 
induced by x’; these are the Silver indiscernibles for x. ci, with no superscript, will refer 
to the ith Silver indiscernible for L. And Next(x, 6) will denote the least Silver 
indiscernible for x greater than 6. 
Recall also from Lemmas 30.5 and 30.6 of [4] that to test whether some X really is 
x’, we need only verify that it satisfies the first-order requirements of remarkability 
and indiscernability, along with T(X, ~1) wellfounded for all a less than wr. It follows 
that x’ is a II:(x) singleton. 
Notation 1.2. (Vx E w”(x”3)), 
u1 = sup Next(x, 0), 
XE0Y 
u a+ 1 = SUP Next(x, 4, 
XEOY 
and for A a limit, 
ua = SUP&. 
OLEll 
So (%)aeOrd enumerates the uniform indiscernibles - that is, those ordinals which are 
indiscernibles for every real. However, there is an annoying convention that we begin 
enumerating with 1. 
Notation 1.3. T1 will denote the Shoenfield tree, projecting to the complete IIt set of 
reals - so, in a natural sense, we can view T1 as also projecting to the complete Xi set 
of reals. If IC is some ordinal, T; will denote the Shoenfield tree constructed up to K, in 
the sense of trying to build a real and embed the Kleene-Brouwer ordering into K. 
For x E ow, T;*” will denote the relativisation of T,” to x - hence, it will be the set of 
attempts to find a real in the cross section of the complete II: subset of o” x ww 
provided by x. 
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Theorem 1.4 (Martin-Solovay absoluteness). Assume there is a measurable cardinal K. 
Let P E V, be a forcing notion. Then 
v <.z: VP; 
that is to say, forcing with P introduces no new 72: truths. 
Proof. Implicit in [S]. 0 
Definition 1.5. A is said to be Wadge reducible to B if there exists a continuous 
function f: cow + cow such that for all x E ow, 
x E A if and only if f(x) E B. 
Definition 1.6. For r a subset of the power set of ow, I’ Wadge determinacy denotes 
the statement hat for any two A, B E r, A is Wadge reducible to B or B is Wadge 
reducible to 1 A, the complement of A. 
It is well known, and due to Wadge himself, that given, say, PD, we have Wadge 
determinacy for the collection of all projectively definable sets of reals. 
In [2], Leo Harrington showed that for any x E ~9, E:(x) Wadge determinacy 
implies the existence of xx, and hence, by Martin, implies X:(x) determinacy. In fact, 
that paper along with unpublished work of Tony Martin - to the effect hat xA actually 
implies Boolean (E;(x)) determinacy - shows that these three statements are equiva- 
lent. 
This paper explores the consequences of II: Wadge determinacy. Unlike the results 
by Harrington, the results here are all in the bold faced form. The main problem is that 
one seems to need sharps for all reals before we can apply the Dodd-Jensen core 
model theory; and then later we seem to need daggers, and in fact even more, to 
produce John Steel’s K in a useful form. 
The Kunen-Martin Theorem 1.7. Assume Vx E o”(x’3). Fix z E ~9. Let S be a E:(z) 
wellfounded relation. Then the rank of S is below Next(z, wl). 
Proof. See [9]. Cl 
It follows from 1.7 that if A is a E;(z) subset of {x’: x E w”}, then for all x1 E A, 
Next(x, oi) < Next(z, oi). One observes that for any xR we have a II:(x) wellfounded 
relation of rank at least Next(x, wi) obtained by applying the Skolem terms to the first 
oi + w many Silver indiscernibles for x, and using x8 to compare them in a Bore1 
fashion. Now we can take the disjoint sum over A: 
TL(x’(cll, . . . a,, CZl, c;, + ,, . . . ) < aLIYl(/?,, .. . ,cZ,) 
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if and only if x = y and x’ E A, and this calculation is certified by xx. This is a E:(z) 
relation, since we are just quantifying over a C:(z) set of reals which will perform 
a certain II: calculation for us. It is a wellfounded relation since A is a subset of the 
sharps. Finally, for any x’ in A, this wellfounded Cl(z) relation must have rank at least 
Next(x, oi). 
2. Daggers 
II: Wadge determinacy implies that Vx E oY’(x’3). The first step in this argument is 
to show that in the context of Vx E o”(x”3 A-IO’), there exists a II&norm of length 
u2. Recall the notation and results of [l]. 
Definition 2.1. M = J,’ is a (pure) premouse if for some K -K a, 
M k v is a normal measure on K. 
Here we use the notation cp(M) = K. M is iterable if all iterations of internal 
embeddings of M are wellfounded. (More detailed definitions can be found in Chs. 
5 and 6 of Cl].) 
Lemma 2.2. Zf N is a premouse, M is an iterable premouse, and 
o:N+M 
is &-elementary, then N is iterable. 
For proof, see 8.4 of [l]. 
Lemma 2.3. M is iterable iff every iterate of M is iterable ifl some iterate of M is 
iterable. 
Proof. This is an immediate consequence of the definitions and the general fact that 
a substructure of a wellfounded structure is wellfounded. 0 
Lemma 2.4. {M E HC: M is iterable} is II: in the codes. 
Proof. If suffices to show that it is II?“. But this is [l, 8.61. 0 
Notation 2.5. As in 6.12 of [l], for any premouse M, c( E Ord, M, denotes the &h 
iterate of M. 
The Comparison Lemma 2.6. Zf M, N E HC are both iterable premouse, then there 
exists a E o1 such that either M, is an initial segment of N, or N, is an initial segment 
of M,. 
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Proof. 8.16 of [ l] gives us that a comparison is effected by stage wl, but then it follows 
by condensation that the two models are comparable at some earlier ordinal. 0 
Lemma 2.7. Zf 
n,:M-+M, 
is an iteration map, then 71, is &-elementary and cojinal, hence X,-elementary; if 
K = cp(M), then 
(p(K))" = (g(K))% 
Proof. These are 5.29 and 5.26 of [l]. 0 
Definition 2.8. M is said to be sharplike if M is an iterable premouse with (H(K))~ E M. 
I will also need a string of rather more technical results, which will be given with 
little discussion, since it is only the final consequence in Corollary 2.14 which is 
important. In particular, I will not define K in the sense of Dodd-Jensen, since it will 
never be directly used, though I should issue the warning that in what immediately 
follows, K is intended to be in the sense of [l]. In the context that V is closed under the 
sharp operation for all sets, K can be defined as the union of all the lower parts of 
iterable premice - that is, 
K = {X: 3 iterable premouse M, cp(M) = K, X E Ha}. 
This definition also works under the assumption that there exists an inner class model 
of a measurable cardinal. 
Lemma 2.9. Zf A? is an inner model of ZFC with 
K # (KY, 
then there exists a premouse M such that 
(i) M is sharplike; 
(ii) (KY’ = Uor.Od{(~(~,)P’*: M, is the ath iterate of M, K, = cp(M,)}. 
Proof. See 15.14-16 of [l]. 0 
Lemma 2.10. Let a E w” with KLCal # K. Suppose an exists. Then there exists an 
iterable premouse M E K satisfying (i) and (ii)fiom Lemma 2.9for L[a], and such that 
Next(M, ol) > (o:)~~‘~. 
Proof. This follows from 21.16 of [l] and Lemma 2.9 above. 0 
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Lemma 2.11 (~‘3 ~130’). KLCx] has covering with respect to L[x]. 
Proof. Or, as argued in Ch. 21 of [l], L[xJ can construct an inner model of 
a measurable, and then xx induces 0’. 0 
Lemma 2.12 (x” 3 A 130’). VM E KLCxl(MP E KLCx’]). 
Proof. Since KLCx’l has covering, but 
LCMI c LCxl 
does not. 0 
Theorem 2.13 (Dodd-Jensen) (xRnn 3 A 130’). There exists countable sharplike 
N with 
cp(N) = 4 yC6<K, Yx E (H(K))Ny 
and 
Next(y, q) 2 Next(x, ol). 
Proof. Choose M E KLcx7 as in Lemma 2.10, so that 
Next(M, wl) > (w:)~[“] > Next(x, q). 
Now let y c 6 < o1 appropriately code (M, 1). Using xLI’, we may assume verything 
relevant is countable. Now using xaaa we can choose a sharplike N with 
cp(N) = K A yp E (H(K))N. 0 
Here is the precise form of I;:-correctness that will be needed. 
Corollary 2.14 (Vx E o”(x’3 A 10’)). For all a < uz there exists a sharplike 
M = J;, K = w(M), 
and there exists 
Y” E (H(K))M 
with c1 less than the least y-admissible aboue ol. 
Though it will also be important to note that: 
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Lemma 2.15. Let M be sharplike, with 
K = CPU@, X, Y’ E (f%#. 
Then x = y’ if and only if 
Mi=x =yA. 
Proof. Since if K, = cp(M,), then 
(H(K))~<(H(Ic,))“~ != ZFC. Cl 
Notation 2.16. Let B = {M E HC: M is sharplike}. Set M < N if M and N are both 
countable premice and there is an a < w1 with M, an initial segment of N,; set M < N 
if we in fact have that M, is a proper initial segment of N,. 
Lemma 2.17. t/M, N E B(M < N v N < M). 
Proof. This is essentially just a rephrasing of 8.16 of Cl]. 0 
Lemma 2.18. VM, N E B(i M < N v N < M). 
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that 
x,:M+M,, o,:N+N,, x8:M+MB, (T~:N+N~ 
are the canonical iteration maps, with M, an initial segment of N,, N, a proper initial 
segment of M,. 
First of all suppose that a < /?. Let 
~q$. .N,-rN,, 
be the iteration map (so that gaS 0 oa = as). But now we have that cab 0 x, maps M into 
M, in a non-cofinal manner, contradicting 8.20 from [l]. 
The case /I < a is symmetrical, and o! = /I is immediately impossible. 0 
Lemma 2.19. d is transitive on B. 
Proof. For this it suffices to observe that M d N if and only if M,, is an initial 
segment of Nut. “If” follows by condensation. “Only if” follows by 8.16 of [l] and 
Lemma 2.18 above. 0 
Lemma 2.20. < is wellfounded on B. 
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Proof. As in Lemma 2.19, M < N if and only if MwI is a proper initial segment of N,,; 
so the wellfoundedness of (8, < ) follows from the wellfoundedness of H(w,), E). 0 
Recall that < is said to be a norm on a II: set A0 if it is a prewellordering of A0 with 
the initial segments {y : y < x} uniformly A:(x), for x in A,,. 
Lemma 2.21. d is a norm on B. 
Proof. For ME B, {N: N < M) and (N: N c M) are both transparently E:(M). If 
M E B and N < M, then N E B by Lemma 2.2. Hence for M E B, 
{N:N~M}={NEB:NGM}={NEB:-I(M<N)} 
is, uniformly in M, A:(M) by Lemmas 2.17 and 2.18. Wellfoundedness was given to us 
in 2.20. 0 
However, we cannot be certain & is sufficiently long; indeed in L”, the smallest 
inner class model closed under the sharp operation, it will be short. So we need to 
“ramify” the norm. 
Definition 2.22. Let C be the set of all (M, y, z, ccl, . . . ,c1.) such that 
ME B, K. = cp(M), ~1, . . . ,a, < (mi)“, 
and 
M t= y’ E H(K) A z is a Skolem term for an ordinal in L[y]. 
For(M,y,r,q ,... ,a.)and(M’,y’,r’,a~ ,... ,c&bothinC,set(M ,... )<(M’,...) 
if: 
(i) M < Ml; or 
(ii) M’ 6 Mr\M < M’, as witnessed by some iterations 
and y < y’ in the canonical wellordering of M, = Mj given by relative constructibil- 
ity; or 
(iii) M’ < MA M G M’ A y = y’ and r(ci,, . . . ,cz”, c’,,) < r’(c$, . . . ,c$, CL,). Here, 
for /I E Ord, c$ is the pth Silver indiscernible for L[y]. 
Set(M,y,r ,... )<(M’,y’,z’,... ) if we are in case (i) or (ii) above, or if we are in 
case (iii) above, but with r(ci,, . . . ) < T ‘(c&, . . . ). 
Lemma2.23. Forall(M,y,z ,... ),(M’,y’,tl,... )inC, 
((M,y,z ,... )b(M’,y’,z’,... )<(M’,y’,t’,... )V(M,y,z ,... )). 
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Proof. Whether we are in case (i), (ii), or (iii) is settled by the comparison process; and 
if we are unable to decide which is greater on the basis of(i) or (ii), then there is no 
difficulty comparing r(c&, . . . ) to r’(ci,, . . . ) since these do in fact correspond to 
ordinals by Lemma 2.15. 0 
Lemma 2.24. For all (M, y, z, . ..). (M’, y’, TV, . . ) in C, 
(l((M, y, z, ...) < (Ml, y’, T1, . ..)I v l((M’, Y’, T1, . ..) < (M, y, T, ... 1)). 
Proof. The comparison process decides unambiguously whether we are in case (i). 
Since the canonical wellorder of a M restriced to (H(rc)) is Ci definable for IC = cp(M), 
and hence undisturbed by any iteration maps, and since y and y’ are unmoved by any 
of the iterations, it is unambiguous whether we are in case (ii). If we are finally forced 
to go to case (iii), G and <just reflect the relation between two ordinals. IJ 
Lemma 2.25. < is transitive on C. 
Proof. We already know that the relation provided by (i) alone is transitive. If Ji is 
premouse and /I < a, then the canonical wellorder of J,’ end extends the canonical 
wellorder of J,‘. So the relation provided by (i) and (ii) is transitive. Finally, since the 
relevant y’s and r’s are not moved by any of the iteration maps, the relation provided 
by (i), (ii), and (iii) is transitive. In other words, Gc is transitive. 0 
Lemma 2.26. < is wellfounded. 
Proof. As in 2.25, (i), (ii), and (iii) each induce prewellorderings, each refining the 
previous. 0 
Lemma 2.27. < is a II&norm on C. 
Proof. C is II: since B is. For (M, y, z, . . . ) E C, {(t ‘, a:, . . . , a:): z ’ is a skolem term 
for L[y], or’, . . . , a,!, are all ordinals, and ~‘(41, . . . , CL,) 6 z(ci,, . . . , ci,)} is, uniformly, 
I-If(M). So, in light of Lemma 2.21, 
{W’,Y’, . . . )EC: (M’,y’,...) <(M,y ,... )} 
is, uniformly in M, A:(M). Since we already have wellfoundedness, Gc is 
a II: norm. 0 
Lemma 2.28 (Vx E w”(xp3 A 1 30t)). Rank ( G-) = u2. 
Proof. In the context of sharps, Kunen-Martin shows that u2 is an upper bound for 
the length of any II: norm. So let us fix some arbitrary c1 < u2 and attempt to show 
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that Rank( &-) 2 a. Fix y E M M E B witnessing Corollary 2.14 for a. So every 
ordinal less than or equal to a is definable over L[y] from o1 and finitely many 
countable ordinals. So fix for each /3 < a, zB, a?, . . . , at@ so that 
ZB(CYI aI 9 . . . 3 &,) = P. 
Now (M y TB,af, . . . 3 3 )BEa provides a cc chain of order type a. 0 
In other words: 
Theorem 2.29. If every real has a sharp and no real has a dagger, then there is a II; norm 
of length u2. 
Theorem 2.30. l-I: Wadge determinacy implies that V’x E w”(x’3). 
Proof. Just using Xi Wadge determinacy, [Z] gives sharps. First suppose that 0’ does 
not exist, and we will derive a contradiction. 
So we find a II: set C with a lI: norm Gc of length u2. Let D be the complete II: set 
of reals. 
Claim. D is not Wadge reducible to C. 
Suppose that z E 0”’ performed the reduction through a II:(z) continuous functionf,. 
Thenf, would induce a II:(z) norm Go on D by 
Xl 6x2 
if and only if 
Thus, we have the prewellorder property for II;(z). As shown at 4B.10 and 4B.12 of 
[9], this is impossible. The essential point here is that X:(z) must have the prewell- 
order property, and this precludes it for n:(z). 
Claim. C is not Wadge reducible to 1 D. 
Suppose that z performed the reduction as in the previous claim. Then C would be 
a C:(z) set of reals, and cc would be a wellfounded C:(z) relation with rank u2, 
contradicting Kunen-Martin. 
But assuming II: Wadge determinacy, one of these two cases must hold, so we must 
have had Ot after all. 
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The general argument hat every real has a dagger is just a relativised version of this 
one. 0 
Let Post’s problem for ITi sets be the task of finding a I$ set which is not A:, but 
at the same time does not Wadge reduce the complete II: set. All Theorem 2.30 used 
was sharps plus the failure of Post’s problem for ITi sets of reals to conclude 
with 0’. It would be interesting to determine whether the assumption of sharps is 
required. 
3. II; Wadge determinacy implies more 
The purpose of this section is to generalize the previous one: in view of Steel’s proof 
of the C: correctness of K, II: Wadge determinacy implies ITi determinacy. I will 
adopt wholesale the results and notation of [S] and will attempt o relate the results of 
[ 10,111. In particular, all iteration trees are in the fine structural sense and K is in the 
sense of Steel. The notions of mouse and premouse will be in the sense of Mitchell and 
Steel, as will ultrapower, extender, simple, active, and so on. There is one further piece 
of notation which I would like to use. 
Definition 3.1. Let Y,, be an iteration tree. Let b be a cofinal wellfounded branch. 
Deg(b) will denote lirn_.r deg(a). 
There is the need for some care in quoting their results. In particular, to ensure that 
Lemma 3.3 holds, and that we obtain a norm like behaviour for the set B below, it will 
be necessary to work with a restricted efinition of iterability. When stacking iteration 
trees, with I an iteration tree on Mi, with final model Mi+l, Definition 3.2 only 
considers the case that Yi+ 1 is bounded by deg(bJ, for bi the cofinal branch through 
pi . 
For cosmetic reasons, I will restrict consideration to models that satisfy ZFC and 
whose projecturn is trivial. 
Definition 3.2. Let B consist of those premice 
Ml=ZFCr\p, = Ord 
such that 
(0) M is l-small, with only boundedly many active stages, and there are no Woodin 
cardinals in M; 
(1) whenever Y0 = (T,,deg,,D,,, (E,, (M,*, &+ &) is an iteration tree on M such 
that Y& is simple for all 1 E 8, then: 
(a) if 8 is a limit then Y,, has a cofinal wellfounded branch; 
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(b) if 0 = jI + 1, N is an active initial segment of M,, K = cp( @)N, c1 d /I, y > Ih(E,), 
Y(K) n Yy”= c N, n < deg,(a), and K < p{yi then 
Ult,(YF, & “) is wellfounded; 
(2) if we have Y0 a simple iteration tree on M, Yi+r a simple deg(bJ bounded 
iteration tree on the last model M? of ~i-i, for i E CO, where bi is the unique cofinal 
branch through Yi, then any of the models MF appearing on any of the pi satisfies (1) 
above for iteration trees that are degi(b) bounded; 
(3) in the situation of (2), only finitely many of the his have drops, and 
DirLimi,,(Mc) is wellfounded. 
So these are the natural restrictions of the definitions from [S] for iterability to the 
class of sequences if iteration trees with a requirement of descending complexity. As 
with the definition of iterability given [S], if M E B, and e0 is a simple iteration tree on 
M with final model M*, y < Ord”*, Yf;” sat’ f is ying the first-order requirements for 
membership in B - that is, l-smallness, boundedly many active stages, no Woodins, 
and 
9r=I = ZFC A pw = Ord; 
then Yt;” E B. A simple iteration of an iterable structure gives rise to a structure that is 
still iterable. 
Recall also the following: let M E B and let 9-e be an u maximal tree on M, then 
Y0 is simple. It follows from the argument given in the first four claims of 6.2 from [8] 
that if there are two competing wellfounded branches, b and c, then without loss of 
generality, there is no dropping on b and Mb is an initial segment of M,. So 
MbI= 6(YO) is Woodin in L[E(T,,)] by 6.1 of [8], and there is an elementary 
embedding ib: M + Mb. But this contradicts either the l-smallness of M or the 
absence of Woodins. This will be important for what follows. The types of iteration 
trees which will arise in comparing elements of B will not “disperse” iterability - which 
presumably might happen at the end of trees which are not simple, since the structure 
of Definition 3.2 (as with the original definition in [8]) only guarantees that we 
maintain iterability after the application of simple iteration trees. 
Lemma 3.3. Suppose Q. E B, and n: NO + Q. is fully elementary. Then N,, E B. 
Proof. Most of the conditions from Definition 3.2 are immediate consequences of 
elementarity. The relevant degree of iterability, on the other hand, follows from the 
proof of the lemma preceding 5.3 in [S]. We let .Y,, be an iteration tree on No and we 
attempt o copy it over to z(&) as in Mitchell-Steel. As long as there are no drops of 
any kind, we maintain a completely elementary map n”: N$ --* Q& where N”, and 
QE are crth models on Y0 and X(&J, respectively. At the first appearance of an 
n-ultrapower for some n E o, we start maintaining a weak n-embedding. Successor 
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steps are taken care of by 5.2 of [S], and at limits we use that all the trees are simple. 
With respect to (2) from Definition 3.2, there is no difficulty in continuing this 
construction for deg(b,) bounded iteration trees on Nt, where b,, is cofinal through 
F0 and Ni is the last model. 0 
Definition 3.4. Let B = BHC, and let < and Q be the following relations on B: (i) Set 
Mi < M2 if for Fi, Fz the u-maximal iteration trees arising canonically from the 
comparison of MI and M2 (as in 7.1 of [8]), then these have successor length, and 
there are final models M 7 and M r with cofinal branches br and bl, through Fi and 
Fz, respectively, and we have that M: an initial segment of M:. 
(ii) Set MI < M2 if for Fi, .Fz, bI, b2, My, and MS as in (i), MT E Mz. 
Recall that we must have MT E M: whenever there is dropping along bz. As implicit 
in 6.2 of [S], the model M: will not be sound whenever there is dropping along b2, 
while MT must be sound if there has been no dropping along b,. 
Lemma 3.5 (Vx E w”(x’3)). VM1, M2 E B(M1 < M2 V M2 -C MI). 
Proof. This is essentially a rephrasing on 7.1 of [8]; the role of Vx E o”(x’3) is to 
guarantee that the comparison process terminates before w1 . q 
Lemma 3.6 (Vx E w”(x”3)). There is no infinite sequence (Mi)iew c B such thatfor all 
i, we have M, ,+ 1 < Mi and for injnitely many i we have Mi+ 1 < Mi. 
Proof. Instead suppose that (Mi)i,, is such that 
ViEo(MiEBAMi+l < Mi), 
and 
ImiEw(Mi+l < Mi). 
We will produce an u sequence of simple iteration trees with disastrous conse- 
quences. 
Let (z, @ii) compare Mi+l with Mi, 3-i having no drops by hypothesis. Set 
Mz = M,,. Assume inductively that we have Mb as the final model of a simple 
sequence on M,,. Assume inductively that we have an elementary embedding 
some yi < Ord”“, with yi < Ord”” for i # 0. Let ki be the canonical map from Mi+ 1 
into the final model of Fi; this map exists and is fully elementary by the assumption 
on Mi+ 1, Mi, Fi, and 4!Xi. 
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Now, following the proof of the Dodd-Jensen lemma from Section 5 of [S], we can 
obtain Ri(%i) on Mb. Let MF 1 be the final model on ni(@i); and let 
where iii is the lift of Tci through @i. 
But now we have an o-sequence of simple trees with dropping on the cofinal branch 
of infinitely many trees, thus contradicting MO E B. 0 
Corollary 3.7 (Vx E ~“(23)). The relation < is wellfounded. 
Corollary 3.8 (Vx E w”(x’3)). < dejnes a prelinear ordering on B. 
Proof. M G M at once follows from the definitions. Ml < M2 < M3 rules out 
M3 < Ml by Lemma 3.6 and thus Ml < M3 by Lemma 3.5. The order is total by 
Lemma 3.5. 0 
The following argument, which is really just an exact transfer of an argument in [6], 
was pointed out to me by John Steel. Recall that one describes a model, N, of some 
fragment of set theory, as a-wellfounded if either N is in fact wellfounded, or if the 
wellfounded part of N includes ~1. It is then natural to speak of a branch b through an 
iteration tree YO as being a wellfounded if Mb = DirLim,,*M, is a-wellfounded. 
Lemma 3.9 (Vx E w”(x’3) A 1 II: determinacy). B is II:. 
Proof. The significance of the Vx E o”(x’3) along with the failure of II: determinacy 
is to ensure that no countable ordinal is Woodin in any inner class model; this follows 
by the results of [14]. So, as in [6], iterability with respect o single iteration trees is 
a II: condition: Fix some countable l-small M which sees no Woodin cardinals; let 
Y,, be a countable iteration tree on M. 
Claim. There exists a wellJounded branch through .FO ifand only iffor all a E w1 there is 
an a-wellfounded branch. 
The only if part of this claim follows at once from the structure of the definitions. For 
the if part, suppose for the moment that there are for each a ~oi an c1 well- 
founded branch b(a) which is not fully wellfounded. Then it must follow that for any 
given ao, b(cq,) = b(cl) for only countably many a. So, without loss of generality, a not 
equal to /I implies that b(cr) is distinct to b(B). Now notice that for each CL, 
L,[E(&)] k &TO,) is Woodin, 
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since we can choose some /I > a and apply the uniqueness theorem 6.1 of [S] to b(a) 
and !I(/?). By ranging over all c1 < o1 we obtain 
L,, [E(F,,)] I= 6(9,,) is Woodin. 
So we have that 
LIE(TO)] b 6(._F0) is Woodin. 
But since we have E(YO)’ by the assumption of Vx E e.P (~$1) and YO being countable, 
the results of [14] give II: determinacy. 
The st-tement that 
VT0 E HC, a E co1 (if Y,, is an iteration tree on M then 3b a branch 
through TO (b is a-wellfounded)) 
is transparently l-I:(M). 
The complication faced here is that our definition allows us to build iterations on 
top of old iteration trees provided they are simple. However, the arguments from [6], 
as adapted in the claim above, still show that no countable iteration tree can have 
branches which are wellfounded past c( for every tx up to wl. Hence, each countable 
simple iteration tree YO must have simplicity witnessed in the strong form that there 
exists a < b < or such that 
L, [YO]cO”(w, ‘) != ZFC A Ye has only one a-wellfounded branch. 
So the iterability condition can be rephrased: for all /?, TO, . . . ,.Y,,, if Yi+ 1 is an 
iteration tree on the final model of pi, and if each Fi is seen to be simple by stage /?, in 
the above sense, then there exists a B-wellfounded brnach through Yk, and all of the 
ultrapowers arising in 3.2(l)(b) and 3.2(2) are fl-wellfounded. 0 
Lemma 3.10 (Vx E o”(x”3) A illi determinacy). < is a lI$norm on B. 
Proof. Since all the comparisons terminate before true wl, we have that < and 
< define exact complements on B and are the restrictions of Xi relations to B. But 
now we see that for M E B, 
by Lemma 3.3 and the observation that all of the iteration trees which arise in 
comparisons are simple. Finally, wellfoundedness was Corollary 3.7. 0 
Lemma 3.11. Let ME B, x, y E M,, where y is active in M. Then x = y’ - 
M k x = y’. 
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Proof. It is built into the Mitchell-Steel definition of a premouse which is active at 
stage y and with x, y E M,, that if M satisfies any sort of iterability with respect o Ef;‘, 
then 
(H(y))“r”~” c M. 
This is the force of (3) at 1.0.4 in [8]. We do indeed have this much iterability, since 
that merely corresponds to an iteration tree which has only one branch - that is, an 
iteration of internal embeddings. 0 
Now we will need to consider the central construction from [lo]. 
Theorem 3.12 (Steel). Fix Q E Ord. Assume that there are no inner class models in 
which any a < 52 is Woodin. Assume s2 be measurable in an inner class model .hf. Then 
there exists a mouse K of height 52, definable from the ordinal 62, such that from the point 
of view of N: 
(i) for stationarily many a < Sz, a+ = (a+)‘; 
(ii) for all X E K, Xx E K; 
(iii) for all mice M E H(Q), there exists a proper initial segment K, of K such that 
M < K, in the sense of Definition 3.4. 
Proof. See [lo]. 0 
As will be painfully obvious to any reader with access to those notes, the above 
thumb nail sketch does not begin to do justice to the analysis that John Steel provides. 
The statement in Theorem 3.12 only summarises a couple of the basic facts. 
As a warning about terminology, I mention that while the K of Theorem 3.13 is 
philosophically similar in motivation to the Dodd-Jensen K mentioned, briefly, in 
Section 2, the definitions are formally very different. It will in fact be true, however, 
that the K of Steel includes the K of Cl]. and below Ot they will be equal. 
The real importance of K for studying II: Wadge degrees is in the following 
theorem due to Steel. 
Theorem 3.13 (Steel). Suppose N is an inner class model with two measurable cardi- 
nals, K < s2, but does not satisfy II: determinacy. Suppose we build K, based at 52, inside 
JV. Then: 
VX E (H(lc))-%lY E (H(~c))~ (Next( Y, x) > Next(X, K). 
Proof. See [ll]. 0 
The conclusion of this theorem is informally known as “xi correctness”. It is well 
known to workers in the field that it gives a tree in K that projects to the complete 
Zi set in V, and therefore, in particular, K<,: V. 
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We need just a tiny bit more technology. Adjusting the definition of mouse, we can 
define the notion of z-mouse for any real z. This will be a model of the form .Yf*’ for 
some ordinal a. Here, for any /I B a, E, will be an extender over @‘. Each such 
@” will be rudimentarily closed and contain the real z. The notions of good and 
sound and projectum, all previously defined for constructibility relative to the E se- 
quence are now defined relative to (E,z). 
To obtain the two measurables for the argument o proceed, one needs something 
like the following. 
Theorem 3.14 (Mitchell). Suppose Sz is some measurable cardinal. For any real z, either 
there exists a z-mouse of height 52 which is C: correct in the sense of Theorem 3.13, or 
there exists an inner class model of O(K) = K++ containing z. 
Proof. See [7]. 
The exact conclusion of O(K) = K ++ is neither important here; nor does Mitchell’s 
result really require a measurable - sharps along with IR inaccessible would suffice. 
The important point is that the failure of K, to be correct entails, at the very least, an 
inner model of two measurables containing z. 
Before stating this next theorem, a number of historical clarification should be 
presented. By Fall 1992, I knew that II: Wadge determinacy implies the existence of 
inner models with many strongs by the partial C: correctness results of [12], and that 
assuming some appropriate form of Theorem 3.13 we could prove II: determinacy. 
Then in Spring 1993, Steel proved Theorem 3.13, thereby filling the gap. 
Following the instructions of the referee, I will go ahead and state Theorem 3.15 
directly. It should, however, be kept in mind that the last non-trivial step in its 
solution was taken by John Steel. 
Theorem 3.15. II: Wadge determinacy implies II: determinacy. 
Proof. Assume otherwise, and suppose we have II: Wadge determinacy, but -iTI: 
determinacy. As in Section 2, [2] gives sharps. 
By Lemma 3.11 we have that B is II: with a II&norm. As in the previous section, 
compare B with the universal II; set of reals, D. As was the case there, B cannot 
interpret D, and so B must be C:(z,) for some z. E w”. 
Now consider the relativized version of B to the set of z. mice; call this set B,,. 
B,, will be II:( and again unable to Wadge reduce the complete II: set. So choose 
zi such that B,, is Ai( Now, since we have daggers, from Theorem 2.30, find an 
inner class model X such that: 
(i) for some ordinal s2, &” b Q measurable; 
(ii) zo, z1 E M. 
Note that B,, is still Ai in Jlr since II:(z,, zi) facts go down to X. Now let us 
first suppose some z. mouse M of height Sz is Xi correct in the sense of Theorem 3.13, 
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so that 
VX E (H(lc))“3Y E (H(K))~ (Next( Y, K) > Next(X, K). 
Let M* be, L[M] where M is some such z. mouse. Let G c Coll(o, < s2) be 
M-generic. 
Claim 1 . ufEGl = u~*CGl 
This follows by ZE: correctness, since every real in Jlr[G] appears in some small 
forcing extension. 
Claim 2. B<cG1 is still Z$(zl). 
Otherwise the forcing would need to introduce a new Z:(zo,zl) fact, and then there 
would be some small forcing which introduces a new C:(zo,zl) fact, contradicting 
Martin-Solovay absoluteness. 
Now define A in Jlr[G] to be 
{y: 3No E BZO, x E No, x c a E No with a active in No and No I= y = x”>. 
This is a Z:(zr) set of reals, by Claim 2. So by the remark following Theorem 1.7, 
{Next(x, Sz): x E AMNCG1 > will be bounded strictly below u$‘rG3. But this contradicts 
Claim 1. 
So we are forced to conclude that no such M can exist. So by Theorem 3.14, there 
must exist an inner class model JZ containing z. and many measurable cardinals. 
Again, II: facts go down, so B is Ai in pi’. By Theorem 3.13, Kd is C: correct in 
4. Now we obtain the same contradiction as before. 0 
One might also wonder to what extent analogues of Theorem 2.29 can be proved 
beyond Ot. Here it is possible to show that if II: determinacy does not hold, but 
Vx E o”(x’3) does, then there is some real z such that there is a II;(z) norm of length 
u2. It is not clear at this stage that we have freedom to choose any z for which II:(z) 
determinacy fails. The problem is that this whole pattern of argument of is essentially 
boldfaced: in order to obtain mice which have a faster sharp than some z E ww, we 
need to obtain inner models containing z along with many measurables - and that 
requires, in some sense, the failure of the z-mice to be sufficiently correct. 
A repeated theme in these arguments is that Ei subsets of {x” :x E w”} must be 
small. It might be worth finishing with what is perhaps the sharpest result in that 
direction which I know. 
Definition 3.16. Let x* be the theory of an o model, M,, of V = L[x] which has 
w many indiscernibles, (ci)isw. Let z be some real that has a sharp. x* will be said to 
embed into z4, if for each n E CO and each n-ary Skolem term z defined over M, there is 
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a corresponding Skolem term r* defined over L[z] and some a(r) < o1 such that: for 
all r1 and r2 defined over M,, with corresponding 77 and r:, and all 
k(1) < ... < k(n) < w 
if and only if 
It is implicit in a number of well-known arguments that if x* embeds in z* then 
x* = x’. So, for any z’, {x” :x’ embeds into z”} is one example of a Y2: subset of the 
sharps. The next lemma suggests that this is in some ways a canonical example. 
Lemma 3.17 (Vx E o”(x’3)). Let A be a Xi(z) subset of {x”: x E o”}. Then for all 
x’ E A, xr embeds into z’. 
Proof. Fix A, some /I < w1 and a tree TO c (w x B)‘” with p[T,J c A, TO E L[z], TO 
representing those reals that are “seen to be in A by stage /?“. So TO will arise as an 
appropriate subtree of T, B:z. It suffices to prove the claim just for p[T,], since every 
real in A will appear in some such p[To] for some choice of 8. 
Fix (4i)i.m listing the language generated by (~2, E, (Ci)ieo). In L[z] we can define the 
following tree, T(u,), from the ordinal parameters fi and U, and the real z: nodes of 
T(u,) consist of sequences of the form (S, t, (Il/i)ickv (Zi)isc, (~1, . . . , CC,)) such that 
(i) k E o; 
(ii) S c w, S E L[z]; 
(iii) each Zi is a Skolem term over L[i]; each ai < u,; 
(iv) (&i)issu(ll/i)ick is jointly consistent with the theory of ZFC A V = L[x] along 
with the requirement hat the (ci)ipo be remarkable indiscernibles and that 
zk_l(c;,, . . . ,ci,) < T,_,(c;,, . . . ,c;,, < ... z&& . . . ); 
(v) each $i is either 4i or l+i; 
(vi) t E T,, is a partial attempt o build a branch through [To] witnessing that there 
is an x8 E A extending the theory (~i)isk; moreover, k is less than or equal to the length 
of t. 
The tree ordering is defined as follows: (S, t, ($i)ieky (Ti)iek, (aI, . . . , al)) < (SO, to, 
($P)ieP, (r9)ick0, (4, .-. ,a)?> if: 
(i) S c So, k < k,; 
(ii) to extends t in To; 
(iii) in the natural sense, So requires that for any x0 consistent with So, 
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for each i E k; 
(iv) $i = +p for each i < k. 
Notice in (iii), no trouble has been taken to require that (~1~) . . . , ar) c (a:, . . . , a:); 
but it is important that they give rise to equivalent terms for ordinals under the 
respective (ri) and (29). 
Notice the explicit mention of u, in T (u,). Later we will need to consider the trees 
T(y), defined from y as T(u,) is defined from uo, for various choices of y. 
Claim 1. T(u,) is wellfounded. 
Or else it would have a cofinal branch, which in turn would witness A not being 
included in {x8: x E o”}. 
Since T(u,) can be defined in L[z], we can find a ranking function in this model. Fix 
such a function, R : T(u,) -+ u,+ 1. 
Claim 2. For all T E Y(L[i]), n E CO, t E TO, z dejined over L[i], and S c CO, S E L[z], 
and kEcq 
R(S, 4 (VW, 7, (~1, . . . ,u,J) < u,+ I. 
It follows from remarkability that if c~(ui, . . . ,unr ci) < r(ui, . . . ,u.), then for all 
a1 < a2, greater than u,, ~(ur, . . . , u,, ~6,) = a(q) . . . ,u., cf,). Consequently, if
tS09 lO9 (tiihsk3 (zThek3 (U1, ... 9%~ a1)), (So, to, ($i)ick, bi*)iek3 (U19 ... 9%~ a2)) 
are two nodes of T(u,) extending (S, t, (tie), (r), (ur, . . . , u,)), then, as shown by an 
induction along the ranking function R, 
R(SO, LO, (d’di.k, bF)isk, (f-J1 3 ... ,Un, a~)) = R(So, to, ($‘Jiek, (zi*hck, (UI, *-. ,Un, a2)). 
The obvious generalization of this observation, omitted for notational convenience, 
shows that up to equivalence, r(ui, . . . , u,) has at most u, many possible terms below. 
So, R(S,t,(II/o),(z),(u,,...,u,))<(u,)+. S’ mce this entire calculation can be correctly 
calculated inside L[z], inside which u n + 1 is a cardinal, we obtain the promised bound. 
Fix x0 E p[T,]. For convenience, view xD as a subset of w, with i E xx if and only if 
tLCXl; X9 E, (Uihso k di(4 Ul, U2, *..). 
Fix a canonical choice off so that (f, x”) witnesses xp E p[T,]. Fix ($i)iea an enumer- 
ation of x’, SO that each t//i is 4i or 1 pi. For each r E P(L[x]), let S, and k(z) be such 
that 
(i) S, c x’ and S, E L[z]; 
(ii) R(S,, fl W, Wo), z, (ul, u2, . . . )) is least among all choices of k(z) and S, which 
satisfy (i). 
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Claim 3. ZfL[x] b z(ul, . . . ) < a(ul, . . . ), then 
Choose S E L[z] and k E o such that: S,, S, c S; for ~j = $i we have j E S; S enforces 
that r(ur, . . . ) < a(ur, . . . ); and k(z), k(a) < k. 
Sub&m (a). R(S,fl kth, IcI1), to, 3,h, . . . 1) = W,fl k ($o),G(uI, . .. )). 
One observes that the tree of nodes extending (S, fl k, (t,bO, til), (a,~), (ul, . . . )) is 
isomorphic to the tree of attempts to extend (S, fl k, (t,bO), (T), (ul, . . . )). 
Sub&im tb). W, fl k, WCJ, 5, h, . . . 1) = W,, fl 4% th), z, h, . . . )). 
First note that the tree of nodes extending (S, fl k, . . . ) IS isomorphic to a subtree of the 
nodes extending (S,, fl k(z), . . . ). S o we certainly have < . But now > follows by the 
assumption on S, and k(z), thereby entailing equality. 
It follows at once from the assumption on r and 0 and the definition of R that 
WC, fl 44, Wo), 0, (~1, . . . )I > RtS, fl k Wo, 11/l), @,4, (~1, . . . )I. 
But now Claim 3 follows by this and (a) and (b) above. 
One obtains a similar result for Skolem terms which are equal or defined from 
differing strings of indiscernibles, using an exactly similar argument. 
Notice that any SE L[z] with S c w will be definable over L[z] from some 
countable ordinal. Similarly for any k E o fl k will be definable from some c1 < wl. It 
remains to avoid explicit mention of u,. Fix for the moment some r E Y(L[z]), say of 
arity n. 
For Y E Ord, let R,(S,, f I W, Oh), (~1, . . . ,u,)) be the rank of this node in T(y). 
Claim 4. y(l) c y(2) implies R,,,,(S,, . . . ) < Ry~Z~(Sr, . ..). 
Since the tree T(y(1)) is a substructure of T(y(2)). 
Claim 5. As y + cc, R,(S,, . ..) is eventually constant. 
The function that assigns to y the ordinal R&S,, . . . ) is regressive on a stationary class 
_ namely the L[z] indiscernibles - by Claim 2. Hence, it is constant on a stationary 
class by Fodor. But then it must be constant on a cobounded class by Claim 4. 
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So for each t E _Y(L[x]) we can find, in L[z], an ordinal y(r) such that for all 
Y 2 Y(7)? 
R,(&, . . . ) = Ry&r, . . . ). 
Claim 6. R,,,,(S,, . . . ) = R(S,, . . . ). 
By indiscernability, y(7) < u,. 
Let 7* E _F’(L[z]) be the value R,,,,(S,, fl k(7), ($,,), 7, (ul, . . . , u,)). Notice that this 
value will be definable over L[z] from /I, ul, . . . , u, and some countable ordinals. 
Hence, by standard coding arguments, we can assume that RYcrf(Sr, . . . ) has the form 
7*(&), l.41, . . . ,u,) for some ~1~ < wl. 
Finally, it is necessary to check that this assignment of 7 to 7*, conducted 
uniformly over all 7 E T(L[z]), satisfies Definition 1.7. But this follows from Claims 
3 and 6. 0 
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